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Do Public Hospitals Respond to Changes in DRG Price Regulation? 
The Case of Birth Deliveries in the Italian NHS 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study how changes in DRG price regulation affect hospital behaviour in quasi-markets with 
exclusive provision by public hospitals. Exploiting a quasi-natural experiment, we use a 
difference-in-differences approach to test whether public hospitals respond to an exogenous 
change in DRG tariffs by increasing C-section rates and/or by upcoding. Controlling for a detailed 
set of mother characteristics, we find that price changes did not affect the probability of a C-
section. We do however find evidence of upcoding: conditional on the birth delivery method 
(either a C-section or a vaginal delivery), public hospitals experiencing the largest price change 
exhibit a higher probability of treating patients coded as complicated. This finding suggests that 
even public hospitals may be sensitive to market incentives. 
 
Keywords: DRG price regulation, public hospitals, birth deliveries, inappropriateness, upcoding. 
JEL: H75, I11, I18, L32, L50. 
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1. Introduction 
Most developed countries face increasing pressure for both improving health care quality 
and controlling spending growth. One common answer has been the use of market 
mechanisms: while universal and comprehensive coverage is still ensured, quasi-markets 
² coupled with yardstick competition and prospective reimbursement systems by 
diagnostic categories ² have been introduced since the ·V in the UK, the Netherlands, 
France, Sweden, and Italy. The idea is to (re)introduce market incentives in a highly 
regulated sector, where publicly-owned providers often prevail. It is claimed that 
competition can increase efficiency and improve quality (e.g., Gaynor et al., 2012, Gaynor 
and Town, 2012). However, side effects may also arise, in particular KRVSLWDOV· 
opportunistic behaviours, such as inappropriateness and upcoding, aimed to maximize 
reimbursements (e.g., Dranove, 2012). 
In an effort to increase the efficiency of public spending and contain public debt, the 
Italian government adopted the quasi-markets model in 1992. As in other countries, the 
national framework legislation required the separation of providers from purchasers of 
health services. The latter was then expected to contract with different providers (ideally, 
public and also private hospitals) the services for all the residents in its jurisdiction. A 
prospective payment system (PPS) based on Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) was 
introduced. A fixed price payment mechanism replaced a cost reimbursement one for 
public hospitals and a fee-for-service one for private hospitals (which paid a fee for each 
day spent in the hospital). Lump sum payments were instead used for emergency and 
other specialised services. Differently from other countries, the quasi-market model in 
Italy resulted in large institutional differences. Given that provision of services is 
decentralized to regional governments, each of the twenty regions defined its own quasi-
market model. Regions differ in the extent to which they separate third-party payers from 
providers, in the degree of involvement of private providers, but also in the prices paid for 
the services. A national listing of tariffs was proposed by the Central Government in 1994, 
but ² coherently with the regional nature of the NHS ² an opportunity was given to 
regional governments to adopt their own set of tariffs, tailored to the actual costs of their 
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local providers. The new PPS started in 1997, and regions not setting their own prices had 
to adopt the national tariff. 
Piedmont, a large industrial region in the North-West of Italy, is an interesting example of 
this institutional diversity. Piedmont set its own tariffs in 2002. The regional government 
decided to only partly separate the providers from the public funder: some large 
independent public hospitals co-exist with public hospitals that are still integrated with 
the public purchaser. Most importantly, although private hospitals supply about 20% of 
total beds in the regional healthcare system, as birth deliveries are concerned, the regional 
government allows only public hospitals to offer this service. This means that all deliveries 
funded by the public insurance scheme are within public hospitals. These characteristics 
make Piedmont an ideal setting for assessing how public hospitals respond to variations 
in DRG price regulation, even in a context characterized by weak market incentives, due 
to potentially soft budget constraints and the lack of competition with private providers 
(e.g., Duggan, 2000).  
Our analysis is based on a large micro dataset covering all birth deliveries between 2007 
and 2012. The data contains detailed clinical and socio-demographic information of 
women giving birth. We supplement data on birth deliveries with information on DRG 
tariffs. The analysis exploits a quasi-natural experiment: during our sample period, the 
regional tariffs changed only once, in 2010. This policy change was related to a set of 
hospital characteristics which directly affect hospital costs (like the presence of an 
emergency unit, research centres, or teaching units). In particular, the agreed price change 
was a percentage change applied to all DRG tariffs contracted with that hospital, and it 
was not related to birth deliveries or maternity units. This makes price changes exogenous 
to childbirth treatments. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that a group of 
hospitals were not affected by the increase in prices (our control group), a second group 
was affected by a smaller increase in prices, and a third group by a larger increase in 
prices (our treatment groups). 
We consider two possible behavioural hospital responses. We identify the impact of the 
price change on: i) the probability of women having a C-section instead of a natural birth; 
ii) upcoding, as measured by the proportion of patients with complications. Using a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy, our key results are as follows. We do not find that 
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price changes affect the probability of a C-section. We do however find evidence of 
upcoding. Conditional on birth delivery method (either a C-section or a vaginal delivery), 
public hospitals experiencing the largest price increase exhibit a higher probability of 
treating patients coded as complicated. As a result of a price increase by four percent, the 
probability of a C-section with complications is higher than the probability of a C-section 
without complications by five percentage points; the probability of a vaginal delivery with 
complications is higher than a vaginal delivery without complications by two percentage 
points. 
The paper relates to two strands of literature: (1) the incentive literature testing the effect 
of changes in DRG prices on diagnosis choice, including upcoding; (2) the health 
economics literature on the clinical appropriateness of healthcare treatments, looking in 
particular at C-sections. Within the first strand, Dafny (2005) provides evidence of 
upcoding when US hospitals experienced an increase in diagnosis-specific prices and this 
response was stronger among for-profit hospitals compared to non-profit and public 
hospitals, confirming a previous result by Silverman and Skinner (2004). More recently, 
Januleviciute et al. (2016) find that an increase in prices may trigger hospital response in 
medical (as opposed to surgical) DRGs in Norway, also reporting evidence of upcoding. 
Our paper also contributes to the extensive literature on the determinants of treatment 
choices (e.g., Chandra et al., 2012) and, specifically, of C-section deliveries. This literature 
has investigated several explicative factors (see, e.g., the recent survey in Francese et al., 
2014), and the role played by reimbursement mechanisms is our main focus here. Each 
hospital is responsible for the choice of the appropriate treatment for delivery. Besides 
clinical conditions, the choice of C-sections is then influenced by differences in both 
medical and managerial practices across hospitals. As for medical practices, different 
physicians can simply evaluate clinical conditions in different ways. For instance, even a 
VPDOO ¶GHJUHH·RIPDOSRVLWLRQ RQHRI WKH IHWXV· FKDUDFWHULVWLFVZKLFKPDNH the use of C-
section necessary according to clinical guidelines) can lead a risk-averse physician to recur 
to a caesarean delivery to avoid the risk of a lawsuit (e.g., Shurtz, 2013). Managerial 
SUDFWLFHVFDQGLIIHUIRULQVWDQFHLQWHUPVRILQFHQWLYHVJLYHQWRSK\VLFLDQV'RFWRUV·ZDJH
can include also a (small) variable part related to i) the containment of the proportion of 
caesarean sections within the limits regionally defined; or ii) the effort put forward to 
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control costs to avoid a deficit and therefore to help the regional government to stay 
within the budget assigned by the Central government. Gruber et al. (1999), Grant (2009) 
and Allin et al. (2015) find that an increase in price differentials between cesarean and 
vaginal deliveries, all else equal, enhances the rate of C-sections, thus presumably 
reducing the clinical appropriateness of the treatment. Our contribution to the literature is, 
differently from previous works, a study of hospitals· responses to price changes in 
markets with exclusive provision by public providers, where financial incentives are 
expected to play a minor role.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. 
Section 3 introduces the estimation strategy, and discusses our results. Section 4 
concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1. Sources and variables 
The data source is the CeDAP (Certificato di Assistenza al Parto), literally the ¶ELUWK DLG
FHUWLILFDWH·LVVXHGE\WKHKRspital where the delivery occurs. The certificate provides a rich 
source of information. These include:  
i) the identity of the hospital, the admission date, the delivery date, and the discharge 
date of the woman giving birth; 
ii) birth outcome: method of delivery (C-section or vaginal delivery), infant general 
conditions immediately after birth (Apgar score), and the possible most dramatic 
health outcome, i.e.,  infant death at birth1; 
iii) detailed information on medical conditions of the mother during pregnancy, labour 
and at delivery: number of previous births and number of previous C-sections, 
number of previous miscarriages, weight gain during pregnancy, twin births, Robson 
classification2, breech births, Rh sensitivity3, whether the woman experienced hospital 
                                                        
1 Information about mother post partum conditions and puerperium is available only for births occurring 
from 2010. 
2 The Robson Classification (Robson, 2001) aims at giving a comparable framework for classifying pregnant 
women. The classification consists of ten mutually exclusive groups, where the following obstetric 
conditions are considered: presentation (cephalic, breech, other), parity (number of previous deliveries), 
labour (spontaneous, induced, or past C-Sections), delivery week, single or multiple pregnancy. Low risk 
birthing women (single child, cephalic presentation, spontaneous labor and delivery week greater than 37) 
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admissions during pregnancy and the presence of diseases in pregnancy (pathological 
pregnancy, i.e., presence of diabetes, eclampsia, hypertension, preterm labour, 
placental defects, mental health condition), delivery week4, whether the woman chose 
a gynaecologist/obstetrician working in a public hospital (or a private practice) for 
prenatal care;  
iv) other pathologies (asthma and allergies), and alcohol consumption and smoking 
during pregnancy; 
v) demographic data on the mother: age, nationality, residence, education and 
employment status. 
:H VXSSOHPHQWHG WKHVH GDWD RQ ELUWKV· RXWFRPHV DQG PRWKHUV· DWWULEXWHV ZLWK
information on DRG tariffs. These data were supplied by the Piedmont regional 
government, which is responsible for setting all the DRG tariffs for public hospitals within 
the administrative regional borders. During our observed period (2007-2012) the base 
regional reimbursement tariff changed only once, in 2010.  
Price variation is hospital specific and exogeneity is assured by the fact that the agreed 
tariff change is a percent change applied to all DRGs occurring in that hospital, in order to 
remunerate higher average costs for some categories of hospitals with four specific 
functions identified: 
(a) presence of an emergency department;  
(b) presence of research centres;  
(c) teaching hospital; 
(d) specialized (vs. general) hospital.  
The hospitals obtaining the highest price increase (a four percent increase) are those 
scoring four points in the four factors above. Hospitals scoring zero, did not receive any 
price increase. Hospitals scoring in the interval one to three, obtain their price update 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
are in Robson class 1, while high-risk pregnancies are grouped in subsequent classes (e.g., women 
experiencing pre-term births and previous C-sections are in class 10).  
3 Rh sensitivity occurs when a woman has Rh-negative blood group, while the baby has Rh-positive blood. 
In these cases, aWGHOLYHU\ZKHQPRWKHU·VEORRGDQGEDE\·VEORRGPL[ WKH PRWKHUERG\FRXOG WULJJHUDQ
immune reaction that may cause serious problems to the child, especially in subsequent pregnancies, 
because of the presence of antibodies in the mother blood. Continuing medical care is necessary during the 
whole pregnancy.   
4 A preterm (or premature) birth occurs before the 37th pregnancy week. A term birth is between 37th and 41st 
week. A post-term (prolonged) pregnancy occurs when delivery is on or after 41 pregnancy weeks. 
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accordingly. Clearly, the price change experienced by each hospital is linked to these 
functions and not to its childbirth activity. 
Our final sample includes 216,760 deliveries occurred in 31 public hospitals. They 
represent around 95% of all deliveries occurred in Piedmont between 2007 and 2012.5 We 
deal with three broad groups of hospitals. The first group (Group 1) includes two large 
hospitals (on average 4,600 deliveries per year) within the metropolitan area of Torino that 
experienced the largest tariff increases. The second group (Group 2) includes twenty-five 
hospitals (on average 1,000 deliveries per year), whose price changes were positive but 
smaller over the period considered. The third group (Group 3) is a set of four small 
hospitals (with on average 500 deliveries per year) whose reimbursement tariffs did not 
change over time. We ZLOOUHIHUWR*URXSDVRXU¶XQWUHDWHG·RUFRQWUROJURXSLHWKH
group of hospitals not affected by the tariff change in 2010.  
We exploit information for four relevant DRGs: vaginal deliveries with (DRG 372) and 
without complications (DRG 373), C-section with (DRG 370) and without complications 
(DRG 371). Figure 1 shows the dynamics over time of the spread between the 
reimbursement tariffs for C-sections and vaginal deliveries (without and with 
complications), for the three groups of hospitals. For hospitals in Group 1, the difference in 
the reimbursement tariffs between a C-section and a vaginal delivery increases from Euro 
960 to Euro 1000. For hospitals in Group 2, the spread changes from Euro 915 to Euro 924. 
In the case of complications, the C-section/vaginal delivery spread for hospitals in Group 
1 shifts from Euro 1420 to Euro 1480, while for Group 2 from Euro 1350 to Euro 1364. A 
similar dynamics over time by hospital groups is observed for the spread between the 
tariffs for C-sections with and without complications and for the spread between the 
tariffs for vaginal deliveries with and without complications. In particular, the spread 
between C-sections with complications and C-section without complications increases 
from Euro 1260 to Euro 1312 (+4.1%) in Group 1, and from Euro 1198 to Euro 1210 (+1%) 
for Group 2. The differential increase for natural birth deliveries with and without 
complications is from Euro 802 to Euro 834 (+4%) for hospitals in Group 1, and from Euro 
762 to Euro 769 (+0.9%) in Group 2. 
                                                        
5 Source: Istat, the Italian National Institute of Statistics. Our sample does not cover home births, private 
hospitals and two small public hospitals whose information was incomplete for the relevant years (the 
public hospitals in Ceva and Ivrea).  
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2.2. Descriptive statistics 
Our main dependent variable is the delivery method coupled with the presence of 
complications. We deal with four possible outcomes: a vaginal birth without 
complications, a vaginal birth with complications, a C-section without complications and a 
C-section with complications. A different DRG (and reimbursement tariff) is attached to 
each possible birth outcome. An assisted birth (use of forceps or ventouse) typically 
represents a complicated case for vaginal deliveries, while most emergency C-sections are 
among the complicated events. 
Identification of the effects of the price increase requires that trends in C-section and 
vaginal deliveries (with and without complications) do not differ across the three groups 
of hospitals before the policy change, i.e. when the reimbursement tariffs were constant. 
Figure 2 sheds some light on the issue. The two top panels of the figure show the 
dynamics over time of C-section rates (number of all C-sections out of total deliveries), 
and complication rates (number of vaginal and C-section births with complications out of 
total deliveries). C-sections slightly decrease over time, especially in Group 2 and Group 3 
(the untreated one). C-sections rates are always above 28%, and for hospitals in Group 1, 
the C-section rate is above 35% in all years. The complication rate shows a sharp increase 
in all groups of hospitals, especially after 2009. While the average pre-policy complication 
rate is 3.9% for Group 1, 8.7% for Group 2 and 4.6% for the untreated group, after 2010 the 
three average rates jump to 9.9%, 9.8%, and 7% respectively. Such increases are large, both 
in absolute and relative terms. Relative differences within and across groups are also large 
(e.g., for Group 1 the relative increase is +157%, while for the Untreated the increase is 
only +52%). In our evaluation design, we are primarily interested in absolute differences 
in complication rates since they represent a direct measure of the impact on revenues and, 
hence, on spending for the regional government. 
Moreover, unlike the C-section rates, the pre-policy trends for complications look very 
similar for the three groups of hospitals. This supports the validity of the assumption of 
parallel trends across groups, absent the treatment, at least when complications are 
considered. To further explore the issue, the two bottom panels of figure 2 split the ratio of 
complicated deliveries distinguishing C-sections from vaginal deliveries. The three groups 
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of hospital show similar trends in the pre-policy period, especially for complicated C-
section rates. 
Following Silverman and Skinner (2004), we couple this evidence on complication rates 
with information on risky pregnancies. Table 1 reports two possible indicators of 
complicated cases: the Robson Classification and a risk factors index, based on a number 
of clinical conditions of the mother (see Table 1 for definitions). We compute the average 
of the two indicators over time and by hospital group. Higher indexes indicate riskier 
pregnancies, with higher expected probabilities for a C-section delivery or a delivery with 
complications. Focusing on the pre-treatment period, hospitals in Group 1 systematically 
deal with a larger number of high-risk pregnancies, while Group 2 and the Untreated have 
statistically undistinguishable risk factors. In principle, however, the difference-in-
difference strategy is robust to endogenous health conditions, as long as the expected 
trends for complications (conditional on observables) are parallel in the absence of the 
policy change (Beatty and Shimshack, 2011). We statistically test this assumption in our 
empirical model.6   
7DEOH  SURYLGHV GHVFULSWLYH VWDWLVWLFV IRU PRWKHUV· FKDUDFWHULVWLFV ,Q WHUPV RI
demographics, about 60% of mothers are between 30 and 39 years old, 67% are married,  
49% have a high school degree, and 67% are employed. In relation to the clinical 
conditions, about 55% of deliveries are first births, 18% of mothers experienced a high risk 
(pathological) pregnancy, 11% had a previous C-section, and 17% of deliveries were 
overdue, i.e., after the 40th week of pregnancy. The average weight gain during pregnancy 
is 10.8 Kg. The average number of previous miscarriages and pregnancy hospital 
admissions are 0.2 and 0.1 respectively. 7KHGLVWULEXWLRQRIPRWKHUV·FKDUDFWHULVWLFVVKRZV
some differences across groups of hospitals. With regard to demographic information, 
mothers in Group 1 are more likely to work (71% in Group 1, 66% in Group 2, and 63% in 
the Untreated group). They are more likely to have the lowest levels of education: the rates 
of women with no education are 7% in Group 1, 5% in Group 2 and 2% in the Untreated 
group. They are also more likely to have the highest level of education with graduated 
women being 20%, 18% and 15% respectively. Information about medical conditions also 
                                                        
6 In particular, we allow for leads and lags of the treatment (Autor, 2003), and linear hospital specific time 
trends among the regressors (Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
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differ across groups, reflecting the evidence (as from Table 1) that hospitals in Group 1 
deal with riskier pregnancies: women are older and more likely to have experienced past 
C-sections, weight gain, miscarriages and past hospital admissions. The proportion of 
pathological pregnancies, twin and breech deliveries, allergies, alcohol consumption, pre-
term births are also higher for Group 1. In order to capture different casemix across 
hospitals, all these observable characteristics for the mother are controlled for in our 
regression model. Moreover, we control for time-invariant differences in casemix and 
treatment complexity across hospitals through hospital fixed effects. 
 
3. Empirical strategy and results 
We investigate whether a variation of financial incentives induced by a change in DRG 
price regulation triggers a response by hospitals, even in a system where all providers are 
publicly-owned.7 In particular, we want to test the following two hypotheses: 
1. Inappropriateness: when tariffs change, hospitals shift patients to higher paid 
diagnoses, by changing the treatment from vaginal to C-sections. 
2. Upcoding: when tariffs change, hospitals shift patients to higher paid DRGs, without 
changing any aspect of care but simply coding additional complications. 
3.1. Inappropriateness 
The empirical strategy is based on the estimation of a binomial regression model. The birth 
delivery type is modelled as a latent variable y*, with y being the observed outcome equal 
to one when a C-section is performed, and to zero for a natural birth. Our first main 
empirical specification is: 
0 if 0 
0 if 1 
'')()( 
*
*
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*
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7 A similar analysis for a different Italian region and a different set of treatments can be found in Verzulli et 
al. (2016). Although the regional framework is comparable, the authors exploit a different administrative 
dataset which does not allow to control for a number of individual characteristics; additionally, they do not 
consider the case of upcoding. 
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where the type of birth delivery for woman i is a function of individual characteristics  
related to medical conditions XMi (age, pathologies, allergies, weight gain, hospital 
admissions, number of children, previous C-sections, etc.) and socio-demographic 
information XDi (education level, marital status, working condition). We include a set of 
dummies for each year (µt), month (µm), and day of the week (µw). The hospital fixed 
effects (µh) capture time-invariant hospital characteristics, including the availability of a 
neonatal intensive care unit or a paediatric emergency department.  
G1 and G2 are two dummy variables for hospitals in Group 1 (larger price increase) and 
Group 2 (smaller price increase), respectively. post2010 is a dummy variable equal to one for 
birth deliveries in the post-policy period (from 2010 to 2012), and zero otherwise. ǅ1 and ǅ2 
are the parameters of interest, measuring the change in the probability of having a C-
VHFWLRQLQ*URXSRU*URXSKRVSLWDOVZKHQFRPSDUHGWRWKH¶XQWUHDWHG·Group 3) after 
the change in prices.  
One possible concern with equation (1) is that any effect on C-section rates induced by a 
price change may be due to changes in classifying patients with and without 
complications (a form of upcoding). We therefore estimate equation (1), first without 
controlling for complications and then compare these estimates with those obtained once a 
control for patients being classified as having complications is added to the model. If the 
results are robust with and without inclusion of the complication dummy, then we should 
be able to rule out that the effect on C-sections is due to upcoding. 
Second, we estimate equation (1) separately for the two sub-samples of births with and 
without complications. We may expect the price change to differently affect the 
probability of a C-section for women with and without complications.  
In Table 3 we present estimation results (linear probability models) for equation (1). 
Columns (1) and (2) only differ for the inclusion of a dummy variable that controls for 
those deliveries coded as complicated (either vaginal or C-section). While the dummy for 
complications is positive and significant, implying that, all else equal, we may expect a 
higher probability of C-section when a case is coded as complicated, the two interaction 
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terms for Group 1 and Group 2 are not significantly different from zero. After the policy 
change in 2010, hospitals do not display any difference in their C-section probabilities. 
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 3, we consider the common trend assumption implied by 
equation (1). We thus re-estimate the specifications from columns (1) and (2) by including 
LQWHUDFWLRQWHUPVEHWZHHQWKHWZRKRVSLWDOV·JURXSVGXPP\YDULDEOHVG1 and G2) and all 
year dummies, which corresponds to consider a full set of leads and lags of our treatment 
(i.e., the price change occurred in 2010).8 This augmented specification allows us to test 
whether: 1) a common trend in our dependent variable existed before the policy change; 2) 
the new prices exerted an impact already in the first year after their introduction, or 
dispatched their effects in the following years. In column (4) we also include the dummy 
for complicated cases, which is again positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, for 
hospitals in Group 1 only, all interacted terms before 2011 are positive and significant. 
Given that the reference year is 2007, the probability of a C-section is higher in all years, 
except for 2012, for hospitals in Group 1. The policy change seems not to affect the hospital 
behaviour as for the choice of the delivery procedure. Finally, in column (5) we include a 
linear time trend interacted with hospital specific dummy variables, which  allows for 
differential time trends in C-sections across hospitals. The results are unaltered as no 
reaction after the policy change is again found. 
3.2. Upcoding 
It may be that the observed higher probability of C-sections when a case is coded as 
complicated (Table 3, columns (2)-(4)-(5)) hides a possible upcoding behaviour by 
hospitals. Indeed, in the actual practice for birth deliveries, the clinical staff usually 
upcode to the presence of complications after the choice of the delivery method (C-section 
vs. vaginal birth). Therefore, the result in Table 3 may be due to the provider upcoding 
more severe patients who are more likely to have a C-section. 
We start exploring the determinants of complications in Table 4, where we report 
estimates of a linear probability model where the dependent variable is now equal to one 
for complicated deliveries (C-sections and vaginal) and zero for non-complicated cases. 
                                                        
8 A well-known example of this DiD approach is the paper by Autor (2003), that includes both leads and lags 
LQ D PRGHO DQDO\]LQJ WKH HIIHFW RI LQFUHDVHG HPSOR\PHQW SURWHFWLRQ RQ WKH ILUP·V XVH RI WHPSRUDU\ KHOS
workers in US. 
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The set of independent variables is the usual one (see equation (1)), including interaction 
WHUPVEHWZHHQJURXSVRIKRVSLWDOVDQGSRVWGXPP\PRWKHUV·FKDUDFWHULVWLFVDQGthe 
full set of year, month, weekday and hospital fixed effects. As expected the R2 from this 
regression (0.08) is lower than in Table 3 (0.40), reflecting that complications are not well 
explained by our observables. The key finding from Table 4 is that the policy change 
produced some response from hospitals in Group 1. After the policy change, the 
probability of observing complicated cases increased in hospitals where the price change 
was larger. We also include in all specifications a dummy for C-sections, which is always 
positive ² as expected ² and statistically different from zero. 
Finally, we investigate upcoding behaviour in more detail, by testing whether the price 
change in 2010 affects the probability of complications separately for C-section and natural 
births. We therefore run two regressions, one for C-section patients, and one for natural 
births. In order to account for possible ´VHOHFWLRQHIIHFWµWKURXJKWKHW\SHRISURFHGXUH&-
section vs. vaginal delivery), since prices changes can increase the probability of a C-
section, we introduce a Heckman selection type model (Heckman, 1979). The specification 
is a bivariate sample selection model9: 
 0 if  0
0 and  0 if  1
0 if  0
0 if  1 
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where equation (2) is the participation equation, and equation (3) is the upcoding 
equation; they are simultaneously estimated by maximum likelihood, after assuming the 
error terms ǆ and u are jointly normally distributed.  
We estimate equations (2) and (3) for the two subsamples of C-sections and natural births. 
When estimating the model on the patients that underwent a C-section, the binary 
                                                        
9 The notation for equations (2) and (3) is similar to that for equation (1): XMi collects medical conditions (see 
Table 2), XDi socio-demographic information (see Table 2). µt and ǌt represent sets of dummies for year, µm 
and ǌm dummies for month, and µw and ǌw dummies for the day of the week. The hospital fixed effects are µh 
and ǌh. G1 and G2 are two dummy variables for hospitals in Group 1 and Group 2, respectively; post2010  is a 
dummy variable equal to one for deliveries in the post-policy period (from 2010 to 2012), and zero otherwise. 
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variable y equals one when a C-section occurred, and zero for vaginal deliveries. The 
binary variable w controls for complications: it equals one for women who underwent a C-
section with complications, and zero for C-section deliveries without any complications. 
Similarly, for the subsample of women delivering by natural birth, y is equal to one for 
vaginal deliveries, and zero for C-sections, while w is equal to one if a vaginal delivery 
with complications is observed, and zero for natural birth with no complications. 
Identification of the bivariate sample selection model is achieved by an exclusion 
restriction: while the full set of medical and socio-demographic information (XM and XD) 
may affect the participation, i.e., the choice of a C-section instead of a vaginal delivery, it is 
reasonable to assume that only medical conditions (XM) play a role in the decision to 
classify a birth as a complicated case. To support this exclusion restriction, we refer to 
some evidence in the medical literature on the link between delivery methods (C-section 
vs. natural birth) and maternal preferences, which strongly depend on socio-demographic 
factors like education and occupational status of the mother (see, e.g., Charles et al., 1999, 
Coulter, 1999, Donati et al., 2003). Indeed, the decision process about the delivery method 
with an active involvement of the patient has become increasingly acceptable; on the 
contrary, the decision to code the patient as complicated totally rests on physicians and 
RQO\GHSHQGVRQPRWKHU·VPHGLFDOFRQGitions (e.g., Kalish et al., 2006). 
From a statistical point of view, the demographic variables that we exclude (the dummies 
for married women, working women and education level) are neither individually nor 
jointly significant at conventional statistical levels in the upcoding equation, while they are 
all significant in the C-section equation, and with the expected sign. We also implement 
some additional Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests on the validity of our exclusion restriction. We 
estimate equations (2) and (3) in the perfectly identified version (where the same set of 
covariates enter both the participation and the upcoding equations) and compare it to the 
model where the exclusion restriction is introduced. The exclusion restriction is never 
rejected, at any conventional significance level.   
Tables 5 and 6 report results from the Heckman type model in equations (2) and (3): while 
Table 5 considers the coding decision within C-section births, Table 6 considers the coding 
decision within vaginal deliveries. In columns (1) of Tables 5 and 6, the main finding is 
that the policy change did not affect the delivery method (participation equation), which is 
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in line with Table 3, but it triggered some response in the coding practice (upcoding 
equation). All else equal, hospitals in Group 1 (experiencing larger price changes) show a 
higher probability of complicated cases (upcoding), both in the case of vaginal and C-
section deliveries, and the effect is stronger for C-sections. Surprisingly, hospitals in 
Group 2 have a reduced probability of complicated C-sections after the policy change, 
ZKLFKLVHYHQORZHUWKDQIRUWKH¶XQWUHDWHG·JURXSRIKRVSLWDOV (Table 5, column (1)). All 
else equal, for hospitals in Group 1, the probability of a C-section with complications is 
higher than the probability of a C-section without complications by five percentage points 
(Table 5, column (1)), while the probability of a vaginal delivery with complications is 
higher than a vaginal delivery without complications by two percentage points (Table 6, 
column (1)). 
In columns (2) of Tables 5 and 6 we include a full set of leads and lags of our treatment. As 
with respect to the participation equation, we confirm results from Table 3: for hospitals in 
Group 1, almost all interactions are significantly different from zero, and no response after 
the policy change is actually detected. In the upcoding equation for C-sections (Table 5, 
col. (2)), point estimates for Group 2 are decreasing over time, even if never significant. 
Instead for Group 1, coefficients are zero in the years before the price change, then they are 
positive in 2010 (marginally significant at the 11% level) and in 2011 (significant at 
conventional level) and finally they come back to the pre-policy level in 2012. For natural 
births (Table 6, col. (2)), coefficients for Group 2 in the upcoding equation are always zero, 
while coefficients for Group 1 are increasing in the post policy years 2011 and 2012. 
Overall, the policy triggered some reaction in hospitals that experienced high price 
changes (Group 1), although its effect seems limited to the first two years after the change. 
Finally, columns (3) from Tables 5 and 6 report results when we include the interaction 
between a linear trend and the full set of hospital dummies. While the upcoding effect 
disappears for vaginal deliveries, upcoding is still present and even larger when 
compared to column (1) for C-sections. The probability of observing a complicated C-
section is higher by 6.7 percentage points in public hospitals where the price change was 
larger (Group 1 in Table 5, column (3))10. 
                                                        
10 7KH GHJUHH RI FRUUHODWLRQ ǒ EHWZHHQ WKH HUURU WHUPV LQ WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG WKH XSFRGLQJ HTXDWLRQV
presented in Table 6 is not significantly different from zero in all specifications, pointing to absence of 
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We are aware that our results could be affected by ecological fallacy, due to inference 
DERXWWKHLQGLYLGXDOV·EHKDYLRXUGUDZQIURPDJJUHJDWHGDWD)UHHGPDQ+RZHYHU
ecological fallacy is substantially reduced in our estimated model, as the observational 
unit is a single childbirth, and we are able to include a large number of observable 
demographic and medical conditions of the mother. Still, ecological fallacy may arise from 
aggregating hospitals in three groups. For this reason, we experiment with alternative 
groupings, in particular splitting Group 1, since this is the group mostly affected by the 
price increase. Results are almost unchanged and evidence of upcoding is still found in all 
hospitals that experienced the highest tariff change. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the response of hospitals to exogenous changes in DRG price 
regulation, focusing on health care markets with exclusive provision of birth deliveries by 
public producers. We identify three groups of hospitals according to the observed degree 
of price variation. We then use medical and socio-demographic data on all women giving 
birth in one Italian region over a six year time span, three years before and three years 
after the policy change. We focus on four DRGs ² vaginal deliveries with and without 
complications, and C-section deliveries with and without complications ² and test whether 
in response to a relative price increase hospitals are more likely (i) to provide a C-section 
and (ii) to shift patients to higher paid DRGs to increase their reimbursements.  
Consistently with previous literature (e.g., Silverman and Skinner, 2004, Dafny, 2005, 
Januleviciute et al., 2016), our analysis suggests that changes in DRG prices have an 
impact on hospital behaviour and influence the choice of DRG. Compared to existing 
studies, we find a price response even in a market where all hospitals are public. This is to 
some extent surprising since a priori financial incentives are expected to play a minor role 
for public providers, due to possible soft budget constraints and the lack of competition 
with private hospitals. We find evidence of upcoding for hospitals that experienced the 
largest price change: these show a higher probability of reporting patients with 
complications, both for vaginal and C-section deliveries, with a larger magnitude for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
selection. We use ordinary least squares to fit the upcoding equation for natural births (complicated vs non-
complicated) and we obtain results similar to those displayed in Table 6. 
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latter. Instead changes in DRG prices do not affect the probability of having a C-section. 
Hence the variation in price regulation does not seem to exert any impact on the 
inappropriateness of health care treatments.  
It is worth highlighting that the presence of upcoding as a response to changes in price 
regulation is detected despite observed price increases being relatively small (4 percent for 
the group subject to the highest increase in price). This finding suggests that even public 
hospitals may be sensitive to market incentives and take care of balancing the budget. This 
is even more plausible within a context, such as the Italian NHS, where external audits are 
virtually absent 11. In the period analysed here this behaviour is likely to be due to the 
more austere financial climate triggered by the worldwide crisis since 2008 and the tighter 
constraints on public finances imposed at the European level. 
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Table 1. Average Robson class and average risk factor index over time and by hospital 
groups 
 
 Robson Class  Risk Factors 
Year   Group 1   Group 2   Untreated    Group 1   Group 2   Untreated  
        
2007  3.286  2.924  2.919    1.554  0.637  0.604 
2008  3.269  2.918  2.858    1.261  0.647  0.578 
2009  3.359  2.942  2.804    1.210  0.699  0.610 
2010  3.378  3.047  2.927    1.009  1.490  1.370 
2011  3.352  3.079  2.905    1.118  1.552  1.427 
2012  3.608  3.087  3.014    1.181  1.552  1.458 
 
Notes: The risk factor index is computed as the sum of the following binary variables: Pathological 
pregnancy, Twin birth, Breech birth, Asthma in pregnancy, Allergy in pregnancy, Alcohol in pregnancy, 
Smoke in pregnancy, RH sensitivity, Delivery week below 36, Delivery week above 40, mother age above 
40. Higher Robson class and risk factors signal high-risk deliveries. 
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Table 2. Descriptive staWLVWLFVPHDQDQGVWDQGDUGGHYLDWLRQIRUWKHPRWKHUV·FKDUDFWHULVWLFV 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 Untreated Whole sample 
 Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Demographic Information 
Married  0.693 0.461 0.653 0.476 0.705 0.456 0.666 0.472 
Working 0.707 0.455 0.656 0.475 0.634 0.482 0.668 0.471 
Educ. None 0.067 0.25 0.047 0.212 0.024 0.154 0.051 0.22 
Educ. Mandatory 0.217 0.412 0.296 0.456 0.324 0.468 0.277 0.448 
Educ. High 0.52 0.5 0.478 0.499 0.506 0.5 0.49 0.5 
Educ. graduate 0.196 0.397 0.18 0.384 0.146 0.353 0.182 0.386  
Medical Conditions 
- Dichotomous variables 
Age <20 0.01 0.099 0.016 0.125 0.017 0.128 0.014 0.119 
Age 20-25 0.092 0.289 0.137 0.344 0.154 0.361 0.127 0.333 
Age 26-29 0.163 0.37 0.202 0.402 0.223 0.416 0.193 0.395 
Age 30-35 0.438 0.496 0.414 0.493 0.412 0.492 0.42 0.494 
Age 36-39 0.218 0.413 0.174 0.379 0.148 0.355 0.184 0.387 
Age >39 0.079 0.27 0.057 0.231 0.046 0.21 0.062 0.241 
Pathological 0.367 0.482 0.116 0.32 0.085 0.278 0.178 0.383 
First birth 0.555 0.497 0.544 0.498 0.517 0.5 0.545 0.498 
Second birth 0.345 0.475 0.347 0.476 0.367 0.482 0.348 0.476 
Third birth 0.078 0.268 0.084 0.278 0.091 0.287 0.083 0.276 
Fourth+ birth 0.022 0.147 0.025 0.155 0.026 0.159 0.024 0.153 
Twin 0.038 0.192 0.012 0.108 0.006 0.074 0.018 0.134  
Breech 0.062 0.242 0.045 0.208 0.043 0.204 0.049 0.217 
Other C-section 0.125 0.331 0.101 0.301 0.104 0.305 0.107 0.31 
Asthma 0.001 0.022 0.011 0.104 0.008 0.092 0.008 0.09 
Allergy 0.099 0.299 0.051 0.219 0.051 0.221 0.063 0.243 
Alcohol 0.162 0.368 0.006 0.078 0.003 0.053 0.046 0.209 
Smoke 0.074 0.262 0.071 0.256 0.084 0.278 0.072 0.259 
Rh-sensitivity 0.103 0.304 0.479 0.5 0.434 0.496 0.38 0.485 
Public Gyn 0.326 0.469 0.386 0.487 0.403 0.49 0.371 0.483 
Italian 0.76 0.427 0.742 0.438 0.796 0.403 0.749 0.433 
Del. week <28 0.005 0.071 0.003 0.051 0.001 0.034 0.003 0.056 
Del. week 28-31 0.012 0.109 0.005 0.072 0.001 0.036 0.007 0.082 
Del. week 32-33 0.013 0.115 0.008 0.087 0.002 0.041 0.009 0.093 
Del. week 34-36 0.073 0.26 0.049 0.215 0.039 0.193 0.054 0.226 
Del. week 37-40 0.757 0.429 0.752 0.432 0.768 0.422 0.754 0.431 
Del. week >40 0.14 0.347 0.184 0.388 0.189 0.392 0.173 0.378 
- Continuous variables 
Weight gain (Kg) 12.099 6.551 10.397 6.315 9.52 7.04 10.785 6.468 
Robson class (1-10) 3.374 2.57 2.999 2.314 2.903 2.121 3.09 2.378 
Miscarriage (Num.) 0.254 0.603 0.189 0.514 0.188 0.506 0.206 0.539 
Admissions (Num.) 0.161 0.519 0.056 0.29 0.034 0.232 0.082 0.363 
N. obs.            55,592  149,112     12,056    216,760  
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Table 3. Linear Probability models: dependent variable is 1 for a C-section and 0 
for a vaginal delivery 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
G1×post2010 0.024 0.015   0.005 
 (0.02) (0.02)   (0.03) 
G2×post2010 0.005 0.008   -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01)   (0.02) 
CC dummy  0.263***  0.263*** 0.263*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
G1×2008   0.050** 0.046**  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G2×2008   0.005 0.002  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G1×2009   0.046* 0.046**  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G2×2009   -0.003 -0.002  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G1×2010   0.079*** 0.070***  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G2×2010   0.003 0.005  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G1×2011   0.038* 0.023  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G2×2011   -0.004 -0.003  
   (0.02) (0.02)  
G1×2012   0.050 0.041  
   (0.03) (0.03)  
G2×2012   0.018 0.022  
   (0.03) (0.03)  
Mother demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No No No Yes 
R2  0.37 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.39 
 
Notes: Mother controls (demographic information and medical conditions) are defined in Table 2. 
CC dummy is equal to one if the delivery is with complications. G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, G2 
is for hospitals in Group 2. Standard errors are clustered at hospital-year level. The number of 
observations is 216,670. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
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Table 4. Linear Probability models: dependent variable is 1 for 
Complication and 0 otherwise 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
G1×post2010 0.032***  0.032*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
G2×post2010 -0.012  -0.002 
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
G1×2008  0.007  
  (0.02)  
G2×2008  0.009  
  (0.02)  
G1×2009  -0.004  
  (0.02)  
G2×2009  -0.006  
  (0.02)  
G1×2010  0.024  
  (0.02)  
G2×2010  -0.009  
  (0.02)  
G1×2011  0.052***  
  (0.02)  
G2×2011  -0.006  
  (0.02)  
G1×2012  0.027  
  (0.02)  
G2×2012  -0.019  
  (0.02)  
C-Section dummy 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother demographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No Yes 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 
 
Notes: Mother controls (demographic information and medical conditions) are 
defined in Table 2. C-section dummy is equal to one if the delivery method was 
a C-section. G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, G2 is for hospitals in Group 2. 
Standard errors are clustered at hospital-year level. The number of observations 
is 216,670. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
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Table 5. Heckman regressions: Upcoding equation and Participation 
equation results for C-Section 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Upcoding    
G1×post2010     0.049*        0.067** 
         (0.03)  (0.03) 
G2×post2010 -0.050**  -0.021 
         (0.02)  (0.03) 
G1×2008  0.037  
          (0.03)  
G2×2008  0.035  
          (0.04)  
G1×2009  -0.005  
          (0.04)  
G2×2009  0.006  
          (0.04)  
G1×2010  0.052  
          (0.03)  
G2×2010  -0.015  
          (0.04)  
G1×2011  0.097**  
          (0.04)  
G2×2011  -0.027  
          (0.04)  
G1×2012  0.027  
          (0.05)  
G2×2012  -0.074  
          (0.05)  
Mother demographic controls No No No 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No Yes 
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Table 5. Heckman regressions: Upcoding equation and Participation 
equation results for C-Section - continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Participation      
G1×post2010     0.102       0.043 
         (0.07)  (0.12) 
G2×post2010 0.018  -0.028 
         (0.05)  (0.08) 
G1×2008  0.205**  
          (0.09)  
G2×2008  0.025  
          (0.09)  
G1×2009  0.189**  
          (0.09)  
G2×2009  -0.008  
          (0.09)  
G1×2010  0.327***  
          (0.08)  
G2×2010  0.011  
          (0.08)  
G1×2011  0.137  
          (0.08)  
G2×2011  -0.028  
          (0.08)  
G1×2012  0.226*  
          (0.13)  
G2×2012  0.086  
          (0.13)  
Mother demographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No Yes 
N. observations      216,670 216,670 216,670 
N. censored observations      149,245 149,245 149,245 
ǒ>S-val]       0.12  [0.00] 0.12  [0.00] 0.12  [0.00] 
    
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the participation equation is 1 for a C-section, 
and 0 for a Vaginal delivery, while the dependent variable in the upcoding 
equation is 1 for a C-section with Complications, and 0 for a C-section without 
Complications. Mother controls (demographic information and medical 
conditions) are defined in Table 2. G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, G2 is for hospitals 
in Group 2. Participation and upcoding equations are jointly estimated using full 
maximum likelihood. ǒ is an estimate of the correlation among the errors in the 
upcoding equation and the participation equation, while [p-val] is the p-value from 
a Wald test where the null is that the ǒFRUUHODWLon is actually zero. Standard errors 
are clustered at hospital-year level. 
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
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Table 6. Heckman regressions: Upcoding equation and Participation 
equation results for Vaginal deliveries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Upcoding    
G1×post2010 0.019***  0.001 
         (0.01)  (0.01) 
G2×post2010 0.004  0.003 
         (0.01)  (0.01) 
G1×2008  0.006  
          (0.01)  
G2×2008  0.001  
          (0.01)  
G1×2009  0.008  
          (0.01)  
G2×2009  -0.011  
          (0.01)  
G1×2010  0.014  
          (0.01)  
G2×2010  -0.005  
          (0.01)  
G1×2011  0.027**  
          (0.01)  
G2×2011  0.001  
          (0.01)  
G1×2012  0.029***  
          (0.01)  
G2×2012  0.005  
          (0.01)  
Mother demographic controls No No No 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No Yes 
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Table 6. Heckman regressions: Upcoding equation and Participation 
equation results for Vaginal deliveries - continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Participation      
G1×post2010 -0.104  -0.050 
         (0.07)  (0.12) 
G2×post2010 -0.016  0.026 
         (0.05)  (0.08) 
G1×2008  -0.204**  
          (0.09)  
G2×2008  -0.024  
          (0.09)  
G1×2009  -0.186**  
          (0.09)  
G2×2009  0.010  
          (0.09)  
G1×2010  -0.329***  
          (0.08)  
G2×2010  -0.010  
          (0.08)  
G1×2011  -0.139*  
          (0.08)  
G2×2011  0.031  
          (0.08)  
G1×2012  -0.223*  
          (0.13)  
G2×2012  -0.082  
          (0.13)  
Mother demographic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Mother medical controls Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Weekday fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital specific linear time trend No No Yes 
N. observations     216,670 216,670 216,670 
N. censored observations      67,425 67,425 67,425 
ǒ>S-val]       0.00 [0.29] 0.00 [0.30] 0.00 [0.31] 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the participation equation is 1 for a Vaginal 
delivery, and 0 for a C-section delivery, while the dependent variable in the upcoding 
equation is 1 for a Vaginal delivery with Complications, and 0 for a Vaginal delivery 
without Complications. Mother controls (demographic information and medical 
conditions) are defined in Table 2. G1 is for hospitals in Group 1, G2 is for hospitals in 
Group 2. Participation and upcoding equations are jointly estimated using full 
maximum likelihood. ǒ is an estimate of the correlation among the errors in the 
upcoding equation and the participation equation, while [p-val] is the p-value from a 
Wald test where the null is that the ǒFRUUHODWLon is actually zero. Standard errors are 
clustered at hospital-year level.  
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics over time of the spread between the tariffs for C-section and 
vaginal deliveries, without complications (no CC) and with complications (CC), by 
hospital Groups 
 
 
 
 
Note: Years are on the horizontal axis, while Euros on the vertical axis. G1 means Group 1, G2 is for Group 2. 
Pre and post refer to the periods before and after the 2010 policy change. The figure shows the dynamics 
over time of the following four spreads: (1) absolute difference between the tariff for C-section without 
complications and vaginal delivery without complications (top-left panel); (2) absolute difference between 
the tariff for C-section with complications and vaginal delivery with complications (top-right panel); (3) 
absolute difference between the tariff for C-section with complications and C-section without complications 
(bottom-left panel); (4) absolute difference between the tariff for vaginal delivery with complications and 
vaginal delivery without complications (bottom-right panel) 
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Figure 2. Dynamics over time of the ratios of C-sections, vaginal deliveries, and 
complications by hospital groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Years are on the horizontal axis, while percentage on the vertical axis. Pre and post refer to the periods 
before and after the 2010 policy change. 
 
 
 
pre pre post post 
